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Is Boutique Medicine a New Threat to American 
Health Care or a Logical Way of Revitalizing the 
Doctor-Patient Relationship? 
Jennifer Russano* 
INTRODUCTION 
The American health care system is changing. Doctors are 
decreasing their patient load so they can spend more time with the 
patients they have. They are allowing patients to have access to a 
twenty-four-hour cellular number or pager in case of emergencies. 
Some doctors are even accompanying patients to specialists, and 
making house calls. 
So why have most Americans not yet experienced such special 
attention at their doctor’s office? The most likely answer is that the 
new luxury health care services popping up around the country come 
with a hefty price tag. Some physician groups are charging a yearly 
retainer fee of $20,000 for the benefit of what they call “personalized 
care” or “boutique medicine.”1 While some argue that boutique 
health care is simply an example of a capitalist society at work,2 
others worry that providing health care services catering to the rich is 
unethical.3 
Part I of this Note examines the current state of the United States 
health care system and provides a brief history of the health care 
 * J.D. (2005), Washington University in St. Louis. Jennifer Russano received her 
undergraduate education at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign where she obtained 
a major in community health care and a minor in chemistry. 
 1. Howard Gleckman, Want a Doctor Who Treats You Like Royalty?, BUS. WKLY., May 
6, 2002, at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_18/b3781606.htm. 
 2. E.g., Uwe E. Reinhardt, Doctors Are More Interested in Having Higher Incomes than 
Providing Better Health Care, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 1335 (2002). 
 3. E.g., Troyen A. Brennan, Luxury Primary Care—Market Innovation or Threat to 
Access?, 346 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1165 (2002).  
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system. It also examines how doctors are paid in the United States 
health care system so as to introduce why some doctors are switching 
to boutique practices. Part II discusses how boutique medical 
practices work and some of the advantages from both a physician and 
a patient perspective. Part III explores the various ethical and legal 
implications of boutique medicine. Ultimately, this Note suggests that 
boutique medical practices are unethical and the easy way out of a 
failing health care system for a select segment of society. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the health care industry take steps to 
assure equitable distribution of health care for all. In the short term, 
this Note urges that several limits be placed on existing boutique 
practices. 
I 
A. A Brief History of Health Care in the United States 
Originally, medical costs in the United States were borne “out-of-
pocket.”4 When a person was sick, he went to a doctor or to a 
hospital, and paid for the services received in cash.5 But this practice 
eventually changed.6 
As medical care was improving in the United States, the Great 
Depression began and the United States economy plummeted.7 
People were unemployed and could no longer pay their medical 
expenses out-of-pocket.8 Hospitals adapted by offering “service 
benefit contracts,” which allowed patients to pay a fixed sum for 
medical care.9  
Even though the concept of insuring against need for hospital 
services was established, it was not until World War II that modern 
employer-sponsored health insurance came into existence.10 With a 
large number of the American labor force at war, and with companies 
 4. James R. Kimmey, Health Reform—The Context, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 45, 45 (1994). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See id. at 45–46. 
 8. Id. at 45. 
 9. Id. Under this system, patients could expect affordable health services and hospitals 
could expect a steady stream of income. Id. at 45–46. 
 10. Id. at 46. 
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experiencing a large demand for industrial output, employers began 
offering health insurance as a means of attracting new employees.11 
The idea appealed to all parties, and the not-for-profit health 
insurance12 now known as Blue Cross came in to existence.13 
Realizing the large available market, private companies began to 
compete with Blue Cross and Blue Shield to manage health care in 
the 1980s and 1990s.14 The federal government also worked to 
subsidize health care services for the elderly and the poor by 
establishing Medicare and Medicaid in the 1960s.15  
Today, employer-sponsored health insurance is dominant.16 
However, even with the government trying to fill the gaps, there are 
 11. Id. 
 12. Because of their not-for-profit status, these plans were often touted as “hospital (and 
medical) service corporations” as opposed to insurance companies. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., 
U.S. Health Care Coverage and Costs, 21 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 141, 143 (1993). 
 13. Kimmey, supra note 4, at 46; see also Anne Maltz, Health Insurance 101, in 
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, INSURANCE LAW 2003, at 523 (2003), Westlaw: 690 PLI/Lit 523. 
Blue Cross was formed in 1930 and was originally called the American Hospital Association. 
Id. at 533. Blue Shield followed a decade later as the American Medical Association. Id. at 
533–34. Together, the two have been referred to as “the Blues.” See MARK A. HALL ET AL., 
HEALTH CARE LAW & ETHICS 44 (6th ed. 2003).  
 Blue Cross plans were usually formed at the state level by hospital associations. Id. 
Physicians also began organizing their own Blue Shield plans. Id. By 1938 over 1.4 million 
Americans were receiving care under Blues plans. See id. at 45. The traditional Blues plan 
allowed patients “free choice of provider,” and “low out-of-pocket cost[s].” Id. Insurance 
companies reimbursed providers after “medically necessary” services were rendered. Id. 
 It is important to note that while the United States was establishing a non-government, 
market-based health care system, other countries were developing government-based health 
care programs. Kimmey, supra note 4, at 46.  
 14. Maltz, supra note 13, at 534. While in fee-for-service medicine, physicians are paid 
for each service rendered, doctors participating in managed care groups are usually paid a salary 
or a flat fee per patient regardless of the services rendered. Id. at 549–52. This type of payment 
system is known as capitation. Id. at 551. 
 15. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 12, at 148. Medicare is a health insurance program for the 
disabled and persons over sixty-five years of age. Maltz, supra note 13, at 536. Medicaid is a 
joint federal/state assistance program that provides health insurance for the poor. Id.  
 16. Two thirds of Americans under the age of sixty-five receive health insurance through 
employer-sponsored programs. This amounts to over 158 million people. See Karen Davis, 
Work in America (2001), available at http://cmwf.org/usr_doc/presmess.pdf. 
 Another study gives a breakdown of health care coverage in the United States by source. 
See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 12 (as updated and reprinted with permission in HALL ET AL., 
supra note 13, at 43). The study found that twenty-seven percent of insurance is purchased by 
private insurers, seventeen percent of insurance is self-funded by employers, thirteen percent of 
insurance is provided by Medicare, ten percent of insurance is provided by Medicaid, ten 
percent of insurance is provided by the government to its employees, eight percent of insurance 
is purchased by individuals, and two percent is provided by the government to members of the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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still approximately forty-two million Americans without health 
insurance.17 Many of the millions of uninsured are the “working 
poor”—those in low paying jobs, who are not poor enough to qualify 
for Medicaid, but who receive too little pay to afford to purchase 
their own health insurance.18 
B. How Are Physicians Compensated in Today’s Health Care 
System? 
To understand why some physicians are switching to boutique 
medical practices, it is first necessary to explain how physicians are 
currently being compensated in the United States health care system. 
This provides the necessary background for understanding what is at 
the heart of many doctors’ frustrations.  
1. Fee-for-service 
Although fee-for-service compensation systems have become less 
prevalent as managed care has become the norm,19 it is necessary to 
mention the system to understand the advent of managed care. Before 
managed care, a patient would see her doctor and pay for each 
military. Id. at 50. The remaining fourteen percent of people are uninsured. Id. By adding 
together the employer based insurance, this study found that only fifty-six percent of insurance 
is purchased by employers. Id. 
 17. Sharona Hoffman, Unmanaged Care: Towards Moral Fairness in Health Care 
Coverage, 78 IND. L.J. 659, 660 (2003). The National Center for Health Statistics (part of the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention) has reported the number of individuals without 
health insurance as follows: 41.0 million in 1997, 39.3 million in 1998, 38.7 million in 1999, 
40.4 million in 2000, and 38.9 million in 2001. The National Center for Health Statistics, Early 
Release of Selected Estimates from the National Health Interview Survey (last visited Feb. 19, 
2004), at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/nhis/released200202/table01_1.htm. Another 
source estimates that the number of non-elderly uninsured individuals was 42.1 million in 1999. 
Steven A. Schroeder, Prospects for Expanding Health Insurance Coverage, 344 N. ENG. J. 
MED. 847, 847 (2001); see also Susan Adler Channick, Come the Revolution: Are We Finally 
Ready for Universal Health Insurance? 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 303, 311 (2003) reporting that the 
United States’ health care system “excludes approximately 43 million people . . . .” 
 18. Maltz, supra note 13, at 538. However, “the fastest growing segment of the newly 
uninsured is the group that has been earning in excess of $75,000.” Channick, supra note 17, at 
303. This group consists of about 800,000 individuals. Id. 
 19. Maltz, supra note 13, at 547. The corresponding health insurance plan is called an 
indemnity plan. An indemnity health policy was the prominent group health insurance plan 
until the 1990s. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/12
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service rendered.20 A patient insured on a fee-for-service basis would 
submit a claim to her insurance company and might ultimately end up 
paying twenty percent of the bill; the insurance company would pay 
for the rest.21 Under fee-for-service insurance plans, doctors had no 
incentive to contain costs because they made more money with the 
more treatment they provided.22 The business world recognized this 
cost-containment problem and responded by creating managed care 
organizations.23 
2. Managed Care: Health Maintenance Organizations “HMOs” 
and Preferred Provider Organizations “PPOs” 
Managed care is the term used to describe the various health care 
systems created to supplant typical fee-for-service health insurance.24 
“The goal of managed care is to limit the services rendered by the 
provider” and thereby save money for both the patient (in the form of 
lower premiums) and the insurer.25 The most prominent managed 
care organizations are HMOs and PPOs.26 In general, the managed 
care organization recruits physicians that contract to care for 
patients.27 The patients pay premiums to the insurer, and in exchange 
for the services provided to the patient, the insurer pays the physician 
 20. Mark O. Hiepler & Brian C. Dunn, Irreconcilable Differences: Why the Doctor-
Patient Relationship is Disintegrating at the Hands of Health Maintenance Organizations and 
Wall Street, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 597, 603 (1998). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Id. at 603–04. It is interesting to note that turning the health care industry into a 
business is somewhat counter-intuitive. See id. at 604. This is because health care is unlike any 
other business. Id. For example, while most companies profit when their customers use their 
products, this is not true of the health care industry because HMOs lose money when sick 
patients require care. Id. “[O]nce the patient needs health care, especially if that care is 
continuing or otherwise expensive, the HMO is financially better off if the patient dies, because 
its costs basically cease where family funeral expenses begin.” Id. 
 24. Id. at 602. 
 25. Maltz, supra note 13, at 549. The ability to keep monthly premiums down has 
attracted many customers and thereby proven profitable for managed care. Hiepler & Dunn, 
supra note 20, at 603. 
 26. Hiepler & Dunn, supra note 20, at 602. 
 27. See Maltz, supra note 13, at 550–52. The physician can contract with the HMO 
individually, through a professional corporation, through a professional limited liability 
corporation, or through an independent practice association. Id. at 552.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
p313 Russano book pages.doc  3/29/2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
318 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 17:313 
 
 
 
a discounted, pre-negotiated fee per patient28—this is known as 
capitation.29 If the negotiated fee is too low, or if a number of the 
physician’s patients develop expensive illnesses, the physician may 
suffer a loss.30 This may cause physicians to feel forced to “cut 
corners” to make an acceptable salary.31 In some instances, the HMO 
may even provide incentives for the physician to reduce the number 
of specialist referrals.32 
“A PPO is an organization that creates a network of health care 
providers . . . who have agreed to accept a discounted fee as payment 
in full for the service to be rendered directly to the patient.”33 The 
group of providers can include hospitals, general practitioners, nurse 
practitioners, and specialists.34 Although paid at a discounted rate, 
physicians are still paid on a fee-for-service basis.35 Typically, 
physicians agree to the discounted rate because they believe they will 
attract more patients by being part of the organization, thereby 
making up the lost earnings resulting from the discount.36 
 28. Id. at 550–52. The managed care organization will often limit the patient’s access to 
providers by contracting to pay only if the provider is part of the managed care organization’s 
panel and has agreed to the discounted rate. Id. at 550–51. Furthermore, the doctor often 
receives the same amount of money per patient regardless of whether the patient is a health risk 
or not. Hiepler & Dunn, supra note 20, at 606. This has resulted in doctors taking on more 
patients to increase their monthly incomes in case a large number of their patients become ill. 
Id. 
 29. Hiepler & Dunn, supra note 20, at 606. Capitated payments are expected to cover all 
medical costs per each patient per month, including “testing, referrals to specialists, or even 
necessary hospitalizations.” Id. 
 30. Maltz, supra note 13, at 551. “[T]he risk of the patients getting sick has been shifted 
from the HMO to the doctor,” causing physicians, in essence, to become insurers. Hiepler & 
Dunn, supra note 20, at 606.  
 31. Maltz, supra note 13 at 551. Capitated payment amounts per patient vary with each 
managed care organization, ranging from thirty-five dollars per patient per month. Hiepler & 
Dunn, supra note 20, at 606. 
 For information discussing the different types of incentive payments made to physicians by 
HMOs and the potential conflicts of interest involved, see generally Stephen R. Latham, 
Regulation of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22 AM. J.L. MED. 399 (1996). 
 32. Maltz, supra note 13, at 550–52. While this may sound less than ideal for doctors, 
because HMO’s control a large portion of the population’s patients, many physicians are forced 
to participate in managed care organizations to maintain a client pool. Hiepler & Dunn, supra 
note 20, at 606. 
 33. Maltz, supra note 13, at 554. Although the first PPO was established in 1911, 
“modern PPOs emerged in the 1980s.” Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/12
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3. Salary 
Some physicians contract with managed care organizations, 
hospitals, insurance companies, or physician hospital organizations to 
become salaried employees.37 Salaries may be paid on a weekly, 
biweekly, or monthly basis, but remain stable throughout the year.38 
Some organizations may provide a salary plus a productivity bonus.39 
Besides being paid their yearly salary, bonuses are distributed based 
on a periodic evaluation for quality and volume of care provided.40 
C. The Right to Health Care in the United States  
Although there is no legal right to health care in the United States, 
many ethicists argue that there should be.41 Ethicists note that illness 
strikes at random and “does not allow people to have equal 
opportunities to succeed.”42 For this reason, they argue that society 
should require health care for everyone.43 One commentator suggests 
 37. Deborah Epstein, Keeping Salaried Physicians Satisfied and Productive, MANAGED 
CARE MAG. (Mar. 1996), http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/9603/MC9603.salaried. 
shtm.  
 According to the American Medical Association , approximately one-third of physicians 
are now salaried employees. In fact, according to one source, six percent of the nation’s 
757,000 practicing physicians have joined unions. Shelley Ross, Medicine and Society, the 
Feminization of Medicine, 5 VIRTUAL MENTOR, ETHICS JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL 
ASSOCIATION (Sept. 2003), at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/10967.html.  
 38. Wayne M. Casper & Barbara J. Gibson, Physician Compensation: New Models for a 
Managed-Care Marketplace, PHYSICIAN RECRUITER, at http://www.physicianrecruiter.com/ 
Dept/retention/9961.htm (Feb. 19, 2004). Health Maintenance Organizations with salaried 
physicians are usually called staff-model HMOs. Id. 
 39. Id. A major weakness of a basic salary arrangement has been a lack of incentives for 
hardworking physicians; bonuses are often used to encourage doctors to provide quality care 
that is also efficient. Id.  
 40. Id. 
 41. See Christine Cassel, The Right to Health Care, the Social Contract, and Health 
Reform in the United States, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 53, 55 (1994). For a general discussion of the 
right to health care, see generally MARC D. HILLER, MEDICAL ETHICS AND THE LAW 53–72 
(1981); William T. Blackstone, On Health Care as a Legal Right: An Exploration of Legal and 
Moral Grounds, 10 GA. L. REV. 391 (1976); Sarah C. Carey, A Constitutional Right to Health 
Care: An Unlikely Development, 23 CATH. U. L. REV. 492 (1974). 
 42. Cassel, supra note 41, at 55. 
 43. Id. To understand this argument, public health scholar Lawrence Gostin suggests that 
one analogize a right to health care to the right to education. See Sharona Hoffman, supra note 
17, at 682 (quoting Lawrence O. Gostin, Securing Health or Just Health Care? The Effect of 
the Health Care System on the Health of America, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 7, 27 (1994)). The 
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that the United States demonstrates its belief in a right to health care 
not in its words, but in its actions:44 if the United States did not 
believe in a right to health care, we would not have Medicare and 
Medicaid,45 federally funded programs providing expensive medical 
care to the elderly and indigent.46 
Conversely, health care can be viewed as a market commodity.47 
For instance, today access to health care for most Americans is based 
on, or at least rationed by, one’s ability to pay.48 According to 
Lawrence Gostin, “the concept of a right to health is too broad to 
have legal meaning. . . . An unfettered constitutional right to health 
care is not currently tenable.”49 
government justifies providing a minimum level of public education by acknowledging that 
education helps to foster fair opportunities for all children. Similarly, a certain level of health 
care is just as necessary to ensure equal opportunity among individuals. Id. Although health 
care does not arm a person with intelligence or skill, it allows the person to function normally, 
often a prerequisite for gaining knowledge. Id. 
 44. Cassel, supra note 41, at 58–59. According to Cassel: 
[i]t is both unfair and dishonest to say that we do not believe there is a right to health 
care, because we are behaving as if there is. If we really believed that health care is 
simply a market commodity (as some still argue), then uninsured sick people without 
the means to pay would be refused care regardless of the consequences to them. 
Indeed, this “right” to care is so imbedded in our social values that refusing to provide 
health care is not only viewed as unethical, but is also illegal under federal law. 
Id. at 59. 
 45. See supra text accompanying note 15. 
 46. See Cassel, supra note 41, at 57–59. Also consider the Emergency Medical Treatment 
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA). EMTALA is an act passed by Congress that requires any 
hospital that receives government funding to screen any patient that arrives in the emergency 
room. Sharona Hoffman, supra note 17, at 672. The emergency room must stabilize the patient, 
even the ones that cannot pay, before transferring the patient. Id. 
 47. See Brennan, supra note 3, at 1165. For an argument that health care should not be 
viewed as a market commodity, consider the following by commentator John C. Render: 
A characteristic of the health care field that distinguishes it from most other 
commodities and services is the provision of a vital human service. Most other vital 
human services such as water and power are subject to state oversight in the form of 
public utility commissions or similar entities. This is based, at least in part, on the 
notion that such services are so significant that determining their availability by market 
forces is contrary to civilized values and should therefore not be subject to the varieties 
of the market system. 
John C. Render, Recognition of Health Care Market Anomalies, 31 IND. L. REV. 119, 121 
(1998). 
 48. Jeanne Schulte Scott, Boutique Health Care: Opportunity or Inequity?, 56 
HEALTHCARE FIN. MGMT. 26, 26 (2002). 
 49. Gostin, supra note 43, at 11–12 (footnotes omitted). Although Gostin does not argue 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol17/iss1/12
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II 
A. A New Type of Health Care—The Basics of Boutique Medicine 
Although known by many different names—“concierge care”, 
“luxury health care,” “retainer medicine,” and “personalized health 
care”—boutique medical practices all work on the same basic 
premise: a physician charges his or her patients a yearly retainer fee 
in exchange for more personalized services.50 The yearly fee can 
range from $1,000 to $20,000 per year.51 In exchange for the yearly 
retainer fee, patients can expect more personalized services, including 
twenty-four-hour doctor access, coordinated referrals to specialists, 
online access to their medical records, same day appointments, and 
longer appointment times.52 Most boutique practices charge a 
membership fee in addition to the cost of insurance the patient 
already pays.53 
One of the first boutique medical practices—MDVIP, started by 
Dr. Robert Colton—began in southern Florida.54 The MDVIP annual 
membership fee is $1,500 per individual.55 With the payment of the 
retainer fee, MDVIP guarantees specific amenities56 and promises 
that there is a right to health care, he does argue that health care is necessary for an individual to 
pursue a livelihood, to exercise his or her rights, and to achieve satisfaction and happiness. Id. 
at 12–14. 
 50. Brennan, supra note 3, at 1165.  
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 1165; Fred Charatan, US “Boutique Medicine” Could Threaten Care for the 
Majority, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 187, 187 (2002); Gleckman, supra note 1. Other amenities include 
telephone and email consultations, nicer waiting rooms, preventive care, nutrition advice, and 
spa-like perks such as bathrobes and slippers. Robert M. Portman, Concierge Care: Back to the 
Future of Medicine?, 15 HEALTH LAW., Aug. 2003, at 1, 3. 
 53. Brennan, supra note 3, at 1165. 
 54. Kris Hundley, Doctors Offering “Concierge” Care, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 28, 
2001, at 1A. Boutique medical practices began in Seattle in the mid-1990s. Id. MD2, a Seattle-
based practice established in 1996, is considered the first boutique medical practice. Portman, 
supra note 52, at 3. 
 55. MDVIP, Membership Agreement para. 3, at 2 [hereinafter Membership Agreement] 
(Attachment 2 to Letter from Senator Richard Durbin and Representatives Henry A. Waxman, 
Sherrod Brown, Pete Stark, and Benjamin Cardin to Tommy G. Thompson, Secretary of Health 
and Human Services and Janet Rehnquist, Inspector General, Health and Human Services (Mar. 
4, 2002) (on file with the Washington University Journal of Law & Policy) [hereinafter Letter]). 
 56. The membership agreement states that the program provides the following amenities:  
Annual Physical Examination 
Comprehensive Preventive Healthcare Plan And Lifestyle Planning 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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that all participating physicians will limit their practice to a maximum 
of 600 patients.57 Although MDVIP originally began with four 
physicians, Dr. Colton plans to franchise MDVIP in New York, 
California, Illinois, Texas, Maryland, and Virginia.58 
In addition to the price of the retainer fees, the patient load per 
doctor, and the exact amenities included with membership, there are 
other subtle differences between each boutique practice.59 Some 
practices, like MD2, only accept boutique patients, while others, like 
Miami Medical Consultant PA in Coral Gables, Florida, still treat 
non-boutique patients.60  
While most of the patients in boutique practices retain their health 
insurance or Medicare, paying the retainer fee in addition to their 
Same Day Or Next Day Preferred Appointments 
Support Personnel Dedicated Exclusively To Members 
Physician Availability (24 X 7) 
E-mail/Fax Access 
Prescription Facilitation 
Coordination Of Necessary Referrals 
Claims Facilitation For Members 
Travel Medical Services 
Private Reception Area Replete With Amenities 
Id. para. 1, at 1. 
 57. Charatan, supra note 52, at 187. It has been quoted that standard physician practices 
have approximately a 1200–1600 patient load, but a boutique doctor in Seattle estimated his 
original panel of patients at 3000. Brennan, supra note 3, at 1165; William Hoffman, Fed Up, 
Some Doctors Turn to “Boutique Medicine”, ACP-ASIM OBSERVER, Oct. 2001, 
http://www.acponline.org/journals/news/oct01/new_model.htm. 
 The Dare Center in Seattle charges $3,000 per year and caps patient loads at 200–300 per 
physician. Brennan, supra note 3, at 1165. MD2, a boutique practice in Seattle, charges $13,500 
for individuals and $20,000 per couple. Portman, supra note 52, at 3. To add children to the 
plan, the practice charges $2,000 per child over the age of 14. Id. MD2 limits its patient load to 
fifty families per physician and accepts no insurance. Id. 
 58. Charatan, supra note 52, at 187. MD2 offers franchises to other physician groups. 
Portman, supra note 52, at 3. The physician group will have to pay $75,000 upfront and a five-
percent royalty to use the MD2 name and program. Id. 
 While the number of boutique medical practices in the country is growing, the numbers are 
still small. One commentator suggests that “no more than several dozen” physicians out of the 
800,000 physicians in the country are currently practicing boutique medicine. Portman, supra 
note 52, at 4. 
 59. Portman, supra note 52, at 3. 
 60. William Hoffman, supra note 57. Miami Medical Consultant, PA offers boutique 
medicine as an option to 150 of its already existing patients. Portman, supra note 52, at 3. The 
fee is a sliding scale based on age. Id. Patients over the age of sixty-five are charged the highest 
annual fee. Id. 
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insurance premiums,61 a few practices refuse to accept any form of 
insurance.62 Accepting health insurance is not critical to the 
implementation of a boutique practice, but many boutique practices 
choose to accept insurance to reduce the price of the yearly retainer 
fee.63 Moreover, health insurance is used to cover hospitalization and 
special treatments.64 
Offering a different spin on the boutique medical practice, the 
Tufts–New England Medical Center now offers boutique hospital 
care.65 The center, a teaching hospital faced with losing money by 
providing care to poor patients, decided to become one of the first 
teaching hospitals in the United States to “open a boutique primary-
care practice.”66 The annual fee is $1800 per patient. In return, 
subscribers can expect longer appointments and nicer waiting areas.67 
The hospital explains that charging boutique clients a retainer fee will 
allow the hospital to continue caring for its poor patients; instead of 
 61. Brennan, supra note 3, at 1166. The MDVIP contract states: “The membership fee 
does not affect the co-payments, co-insurance or deductibles that you are required to pay 
pursuant to the terms of your insurance coverage. You will be financially responsible for any 
co-payments, co-insurance or deductible amounts required by your insurer.” Membership 
Agreement, supra note 55, para. 6, at 3. 
 62. Steven M. Goldstein, The Legal Risks of Boutique Medicine, at 
http://www.legaliq.info/articles/healthcare/20030827.asp. MD2 does not accept any form of 
insurance. Portman, supra note 52 at 3. 
 63. See Brennan, supra note 3, at 1166.  
 64. Id. at 1166. According to Brennan, boutique “patients leave the luxury practice 
whenever they are hospitalized or receive care from a specialist.” Id.  
 Brennan suggests that boutique medical practices may threaten insurance companies for 
three reasons. First, some believe it is unfair to charge insureds a retainer fee because they are 
already paying a premium to the insurance company. Second, some may fear that patients who 
join boutique practices will begin to expect more than just special personal services. For 
example, patients may also begin to expect luxury diagnostic and therapeutic procedures. Third, 
insurance companies may fear that boutique doctors will become inefficient gatekeepers, as 
their main source of income becomes retainer fees and they become less concerned with 
insurance company incentives. Id. at 1166–67. 
 Although research shows insurance companies generally have not refused to insure 
boutique practices or physicians, many are studying the situation. Id. at 1167. One scholar 
found that an executive of one managed care organization does not believe his company will 
contract with boutique doctors. Id. This executive fears the retainer fee is too similar to the 
prohibited “access fee.” Id. 
 65. Steve Smith, The Boutique Medicine Boom: Perspectives on the Growth of a 
Controversial Trend, PRACTICE BUILDERS, Sept./Oct. 2003, at 1, available at 
http://www.practicebuilders.com/pdf_newsletter/whatsworking_1003.pdf. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
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passing the retainer fee from wealthy patients to wealthy physicians, 
the hospital is using the money to subsidize the hospital’s primary 
care practice.68  
Conversion to a boutique medical practice can be very informal.69 
After deciding to convert to the MDVIP boutique practice, Dr. Robert 
Colton sent letters to all of his patients informing them of his decision 
and inviting the first 600 people to respond into his new personalized 
practice.70 The remaining patients were instructed that they would 
need to find a new doctor.71 
B. Advantages of Boutique Medicine 
Although some might blame the emergence of this new kind of 
class-based medicine on the sheer greed of physicians, many doctors 
claim they entered the new practice out of frustration with medicine 
due to the restrictions imposed by managed care.72 The advent of 
managed care robbed doctors of unfettered control and replaced it 
with foreign concepts like “preauthorization, utilization review, and 
economic incentives to reduce the cost of health care.”73 The decrease 
 68. Id. 
 69. William Hoffman, supra note 57. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. It is often difficult for patients to learn that his or her doctor is converting to a 
boutique practice that they may not be able to afford. Id. One physician stated that although 
most of his patients wished him well, some expressed anger. Id. He also acknowledged that 
“[t]he biggest hurdle for anybody is extricating yourself from your previous life . . . . In 
essence, you’re retiring from private practice.” Id. 
 72. See generally Peter D. Jacobson, Who Killed Managed Care? A Policy Whodunit, 47 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 365, 370 (2003). A study on managed care and physician satisfaction 
indicates that primary care physicians who receive income from capitated managed care 
contracts are significantly unhappier than those physicians who do not receive capitated 
income. Sharon B. Buchbinder et al., Managed Care and Primary Care Physicians’ Overall 
Career Satisfaction, 28 J. HEALTH CARE FIN. 35 (2001).  
 Dr. Kaminetsky, an internist for MDVIP, has claimed that he was so unhappy with 
practicing medicine under managed care that he was ready to stop practicing altogether: “‘I was 
seeing 30 patients a day on an accelerating treadmill. It was either do this, or leave clinical 
practice. I don’t think the public realizes the depth of physicians’ dissatisfaction.’” Hundley, 
supra note 54; see also William Hoffman, supra note 57. 
 73. Jacobson, supra note 72, at 370. In fact, some have claimed that the onset of managed 
care has destroyed the doctor-patient relationship. Hiepler & Dunn, supra note 20, at 598. One 
commentary suggests: “By interfering with and constraining the relationship between patients 
and doctors, health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have made the two no longer 
accountable to each other, all the while standing back and claiming that they have nothing to do 
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in physician autonomy, combined with low reimbursement rates, 
rising overheads, and rising malpractice premiums,74 makes it easier 
to understand why some doctors were looking for a change. 
Dr. Maron, internist at MD2 and the alleged pioneer of boutique 
medicine, claims he came up with the concept after asking himself 
what he would do “if [he] could practice medicine in the ideal.”75 The 
“ideal” of boutique medicine has ultimately functioned to remove the 
financial pressures imposed by managed care. For example, with 
money coming into the practice from annual retainer agreements, 
physicians no longer have to rely solely on insurance 
reimbursements.76 With the retainer as supplemental income, 
physicians in boutique practices can see fewer patients per day77 
while actually increasing their salaries.78 
with medical decisions.” Id. 
 74. One commentator noted, “doctors frequently practice ‘defensive medicine’ due to 
rising malpractice premiums . . . For example, the onslaught of medical malpractice claims in 
the 1970s resulted in alarming 500% increases in malpractice premiums in some states.” Susan 
L. Cockrell, Joint Tortfeasors Beware: Double Recovery May Be Allowed, 50 S.C. L. REV. 
1081, 1090 n.63 (1999) (citing Patricia M. Danzon, Malpractice Liability: Is the Grass on the 
Other Side Greener?, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 176, 178, 180 (Peter H. Schuck 
ed., 1991)) (citation omitted). 
 In an August 2003 report to Congressional Requestors, The United States General 
Accounting Office noted the implications of the rising cost of medical malpractice premiums on 
access to care:  
Medical malpractice insurance premium rates increased rapidly in some states 
beginning in the late 1990s after several years of relative stability, similar to previous 
cycles of rising premiums that occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. Between 2001 
and 2002, premium rates for the specialties of general surgery, internal medicine, and 
obstetrics/gynecology (OB/GYN) increased by about 15 percent on average nationally, 
and over 100 percent for certain of these specialists in some states. In response to these 
rising premiums, representatives of health care providers—including physicians, 
hospitals, and nursing homes—and the media have reported that physicians have 
moved out of states experiencing the highest increases, retired, or reduced or 
eliminated certain high-risk services. 
United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requestors, Medical 
Malpractice: Implications of Rising Premiums on Access to Health Care, available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03836.pdf. 
 75. William Hoffman, supra note 57. 
 76. Brennan, supra note 3, at 1165. 
 77. Id.; William Hoffman, supra note 57. 
 For the results of a survey indicating that doctors are discontented with the amount of time 
spent with each patient, see David G. Fairchild et al., When Sick Patients Switch Primary Care 
Physicians: The Impact on AMCs Participating in Capitation, 75 ACAD. MED. 980 (2000). 
 78. The doctors at MDVIP receive two-thirds of each retainer fee. Hundley, supra note 
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Smaller patient loads can create many benefits for the physician.79 
First, the physician will be able to spend more time with the patients 
he or she sees,80 increasing the intimacy of the physician-patient 
relationship.81 Second, the doctor will have more time for courtesy 
activities, such as accompanying patients to specialists or making 
house calls.82 Third, the physician will have more time for career 
development in the form of workshops and seminars.83 Fourth, the 
physician can enjoy more personal time with his or her family.84  
Not only do physicians benefit by gaining more time, they also 
increase their yearly income.85 Even though the fee schedules 
54; see also infra text accompanying notes 85–87. 
 79. Brennan, supra note 3, at 1165. 
 80. Id. A typical primary care physician will see twenty patients per day for fifteen 
minutes, or for twenty-five minutes if it is the patient’s first visit. Id. Dr. Bernard Kaminetsky 
of MDVIP claims that before he was a boutique physician he was forced to spend as little time 
with a patient as ten minutes. Under MDVIP he claims that his “routine patient visit is 30 
minutes; new patients receive 90 minutes.” Bernard Kaminetsky & Jay Jacobson, Is “Boutique 
Medicine” Ethical? PHYSICIAN’S WEEKLY (Jan. 7, 2002), at http://www.physweekly.com/ 
pc.asp?issueid=28questionid=~4pintable=1. 
 81. Kaminetsky & Jacobson, supra note 80. According to Dr. Kaminetsky, an internist at 
MDVIP:  
In my former practice of 17 years, I felt like a “provider”—devalued and invisible. I 
would finish seeing up to 30 patients a day at 9 p.m. and congratulate myself for 
having survived it. Due to the sheer volume and pace required to maintain an 
economically viable practice, I was burning out and considering leaving medicine. 
Id. 
 82. William Hoffman, supra note 57. Dr. Kaminetsky of MDVIP expressed a sense of 
fulfillment when speaking about a house call he made: “You get a sense that you’ve really 
attended to a problem and it’s so much more gratifying. I even paid a house call to a patient 
who was dying last week. It’s been years since I did that.” Hundley, supra note 54. 
 83. See William Hoffman, supra note 57. 
 84. Portman, supra note 52, at 1. 
 85. Doctors in the United States earn an average of 5.5 times the average wage. Reinhardt, 
supra note 2 (citing data from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). 
Reinhardt suggests that boutique medicine is not an effort by American doctors to provide 
better, more personalized care to their patients, but an effort “to keep the income ratio at 5.5 or 
above.” Id. For a comprehensive survey of physician salaries broken down by specialty and the 
organization releasing the data, see Physicians Search, Physician Salary Surveys (last modified 
Mar. 7, 2001), at http://www.physicianssearch.com/physician/salary.html. 
 It is important to note that most physicians taking advantage of the new boutique medical 
practices are general practitioners or family physicians. Id. According to one survey, the 
average family practitioner makes $122,625. Specialists make significantly more money than 
family practitioners. Id. For example, the average anesthesiologist makes $203,326, the average 
gynecologist makes $206,031, the average general surgeon makes $190,273, and the emergency 
medical specialist makes $157,286. Id. 
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between boutique practices vary, all boost the participating 
physicians’ incomes.86 A Seattle-based retainer medicine practice 
claims that switching over from a standard practice increased its 
physicians’ salaries by ten to twenty percent.87 
In addition to benefiting physicians, boutique medicine also 
benefits certain patients. Those who pay yearly retainers can spend 
more time with their physicians and less time waiting for 
appointments.88 
III 
A. The Ethical Implications 
While some view boutique medicine as a market innovation 
serving the interests of a group of patients and physicians,89 many 
view boutique medicine as unethical and discriminatory.90 The 
following sections discuss the ethical implications of boutique 
medicine, including the possibility of undermining the social 
responsibility aspects of health insurance, the widening of the gap 
between health care for the rich and the poor, and the disregard for 
the professional responsibility of doctors. An opinion examining 
 86. Brennan, supra note 3, at 1165. 
 87. William Hoffman, supra note 57. 
 88. In fact, a sixty-year-old patient of an MDVIP physician raved about being part of the 
elite practice:  
“I go to other doctors and have to wait an hour and a half for a three-minute visit . . . .” 
“With MDVIP, I paged my doctor at 10 o’clock one night and heard from him five 
minutes later. I was on my way to the drug store in 15 minutes.” . . . “They say this 
program is only for the rich,” . . . “And you know what? So be it. How many poor 
people can afford a country club? This is like joining a county club, and I am paying 
$1,500 for the best one in town.” 
Hundley, supra note 54, at 8A. 
 The MDVIP Brochure lists a page of quotations from satisfied customers, including the 
following: “I never felt so secure with my medical needs.” MDVIP, VIP Access 6 (Attachment 
1 to Letter, supra note 55). “No more waiting and worrying — I get quick responses to all of 
my medical questions.” Id. “I was so surprised when the morning after my eye surgery, the 
doctor called to see how I was doing. My doctor has the time to care!” Id. “ I never felt so good 
when I felt so bad. My doctor really cares and has time to give the personalized service I want!” 
Id. 
 89. See Brennan, supra note 3, at 1165. 
 90. See generally Kaminetsky & Jacobson, supra note 80; Charatan, supra note 52; 
Brennan, supra note 3. 
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boutique practices drafted by the American Medical Association’s 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs91 is also discussed.  
1. The Social Implications of Health Insurance 
Health insurance can be viewed as a system serving a societal 
purpose.92 It brings society together by pooling people’s money for 
use by those who need the most expensive medical care.93 Some 
scholars speak of insurance as a “societal responsibility”94—a way of 
spreading the unexpected future losses of one person among the 
members of society who are willing and able to pay.95 
In reality, however, individuals most likely do not purchase 
insurance out of a sense of responsibility toward the community.96 
Nonetheless, one can argue that boutique medical practices that make 
it unnecessary for individuals to contribute to the health insurance 
pool97 undermine cross-subsidized care.98 By taking the wealthy 
people who often purchase the most elaborate and expensive 
 91. See infra note 119 (explaining the role of American Medical Association’s Council on 
Ethical and Judicial Affairs). 
 92. See John V. Jacobi, After Managed Care: Gray Boxes, Tiers and Consumerism, 47 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 397, 407 (2003). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. Deborah Stone is the commentator attributed with speaking of insurance as a 
societal responsibility. She once expressed:  
Insurance is a social institution that particularly invites moral contemplation about 
questions of suffering, compassion, and responsibility. . . . The basic premise of 
insurance is collective responsibility, for harms that befall individuals, because 
insurance pools people’s savings to pay for individuals’ future losses. Thus, whenever 
insurance is discussed, questions of allocating responsibility between individuals and 
society are barely beneath the surface. 
Id. (quoting Deborah A. Stone, Beyond Moral Hazard: Insurance as Moral Opportunity, 6 
CONN. INS. L.J. 11, 16 (1999) (footnotes omitted)). 
 95. “[T]he American health care system has been dependent on cross-subsidies from 
patients with good insurance coverage to those with poor coverage or none.” Brennan, supra 
note 3, at 1167. For example, a hospital can care for a poor person without insurance because it 
often receives payments in excess of the cost of care from well-insured patients. Id. 
 96. Sharona Hoffman, supra note 17, at 670. This author ventures, “consumers do not 
purchase insurance for altruistic reasons or out of a sense of social responsibility. Rather, they 
try to obtain maximum protection for the cheapest rate, to their own advantage.” Id. 
 97. See supra note 64. 
 98. Some boutique practices refuse to “take any Medicare or private insurance.” 
Goldstein, supra note 62. 
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insurance plans out of the market, boutique practices are decreasing 
the amount in the pool and reducing affordable access to care.99  
2. Widening the Gap 
A huge gap in health care already exists between the wealthy and 
the poor.100 Accordingly, many opponents of boutique medicine 
argue that its “effect on access” to care—access that is already so 
disjointed—is the main problem.101 If a large number of doctors 
begin charging retainer fees to access their care, access to health care 
will become a problem.102 In effect, boutique care will begin to widen 
the existing gap in the United States health care system, polarizing 
the wealthy from everyone else.103  
On the other hand, proponents of boutique care argue that 
boutique practices do not threaten the majority of health care 
practices and are only being used to “fill[] a small niche.”104 
Furthermore, proponents might argue that inequalities have always 
existed in health care and been accepted.105 For example, few 
physicians choose to work in “impoverished inner-city or rural 
areas.”106 Some physicians do not even accept Medicaid. As a result, 
the poor have always had less access to medical care.107 
3. The Professional Responsibility of Doctors 
Physicians have always been held to high standards.108 In fact, 
being a doctor is one of the most respected professions in the 
 99. See also the AMA principles of medical ethics discussed infra Part III.A.4. 
 100. Gostin, supra note 43, at 28. “Health disparities between poor people and those with 
higher incomes are almost universal for all dimensions of health.” Id. at 31. (footnote omitted) 
“[T]he Institutes of Medicine estimates that one-third to one-half of the gaps in mortality rates 
are attributable to difficulties in obtaining access to care.” Id. at 33. 
 101. Brennan, supra note 3, at 1167. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 1168. 
 106. Id. 
 107. See id. 
 108. More than 2000 years ago, Hippocrates recognized that doctors were special members 
of society. Hiepler & Dunn, supra note 20, at 598. He suggested that a physician’s job came 
with special esteemed responsibilities. Id. 
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country.109 As professionals, doctors are dedicated to serving the sick 
and providing services for the underinsured and the uninsured.110 The 
doctor-patient relationship is legally important.111 Doctors have a 
fiduciary duty to their patients.112 Because doctors are in a position of 
power and trust, society relies on their fidelity and integrity to put the 
medical needs of patients before their own financial interest.113 
Some believe that doctors participating in a boutique practice do 
not respectfully represent the profession.114 They suggest that these 
doctors place the burden of caring for the poor on other doctors115 so 
they may relieve their own stress while simultaneously increasing 
 109. “Physicians top the list of the 17 most prestigious professions and occupations as 
perceived by the public, according to the results of a Harris poll.” The American Academy of 
Orthopaedic Surgeons Bulletin, Physicians Top List of Prestigious Professions, Jobs (last 
modified Aug. 12, 1998), at http://www.aaos.org/wordhtm/bulletin/aug98/fline7.htm. 
According to abcnews.com, 61 percent of adults polled said they believed doctors had “great 
prestige.” The Harris Poll, taken in 1998 shows that doctors have not been rated so 
prestigiously since 1977. Humphrey Taylor, Doctors’ Prestige Rises Sharply, THE HARRIS 
POLL (June 17, 1998), available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/ 
index.asp?PID=177. It has been suggested that the trend may represent the “public’s increasing 
dislike for managed care.” Id. Patients may often see doctors as being on their side. Id. 
 110. Kaminetsky & Jacobson, supra note 80.  
 111. The doctor-patient relationship has many facets. While historically the relationship 
has been held sacred, today it is mainly defined by legal principles. Hiepler & Dunn, supra note 
20, at 599. The courts in the United States have determined several legal principles. Id. First, 
the “doctor owes a fiduciary duty to the patient.” Id. Second, the doctor has a duty to practice 
medicine with the applicable standard of care. Id. Otherwise the doctor can be liable for 
malpractice. Id. at 599–600. Third, doctors are held to various codes of ethics. Id. at 600.  
 112. Hiepler & Dunn, supra note 20, at 599. Fiduciary duty is “a duty to place the interests 
and well-being of the patient above the interests of the doctor or a third party. Id.  
 113. ONCOLOGY NEWS INTERNATIONAL, vol. 6, n. 12, Dec. 1997. In fact, the Hippocratic 
oath states that the doctor should “do no harm” and “put the patient’s interest first and 
foremost.” Id.  
 One could argue that doctors participating in boutique practices are putting the interests of 
their wealthy patients first and the interests of their less wealth, non-boutique patients second. 
 114. Id. According to Dr. Jacobson, “spending more time with patients because they will 
pay more is not responsible.” Id. Ira Mandel, a Tampa physician recognizes the struggles 
today’s doctors are facing, but is concerned that boutique health care practices are giving 
physicians a bad name:  
Doctors are seeing more patients, working longer hours, feeling more hassles from 
managed care and seeing their incomes fall. It is understandable that they want to take 
charge and accept higher compensation for fewer patients, but it is very unproductive. 
It gives the appearance that doctors are being greedy and catering to the highest bidder. 
Hundley, supra note 54. 
 115. Kaminetsky & Jacobson, supra note 80. 
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their incomes.116 One doctor even suggests that boutique medical 
practices are unproductive and greedy.117 
4. The Opinion of the American Medical Association (AMA)118 
At the 2003 annual meeting of the AMA Council on Ethical and 
Judicial Affairs,119 the council agreed that retainer medical practices 
are not unethical.120 The AMA qualified its statement121 by noting 
that while charging a retainer fee for more face time and 
“personalized” care is ethical, it would be unethical if boutique 
doctors guaranteed better or more technically advanced care.122 The 
council also explained that it does not currently see boutique 
medicine as a threat to access because so few physicians are 
 116. Id.; see also infra Part II.B. 
 117. Hundley, supra note 54. 
 118. The AMA is a national professional organization of physicians. The organization 
works to speak out on certain issues important to the health of the United States and its citizens 
by drafting policies on issues decided through a democratic, policy making process. See 
generally AMA Ethics, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2416.html. 
 119. The AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs is the body responsible for updating 
the AMA Code on Medical Ethics, one of the most recognized ethics guides for physicians. See 
generally http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2498.html (last modified Sept. 10, 2004). 
The Council consists of nine members—seven practicing physicians, a resident, and a medical 
student. Id. Each is nominated by the American Medical Association’s president and elected by 
the House of Delegates. Id. 
 120. applesforhealth.com, Boutique Medicine Passes Ethics Test (June 20, 2003), at 
http://applesforhealth.com/HealthyFeatures/boumedpase5.html. 
 121. The statement was drafted without reviewing a copy of any boutique practice contract. 
Id. 
 122. Id. The ethical opinion states: “it is important that a retainer contract not be promoted 
as a promise for better, diagnostic or therapeutic service.” Id. One commentator criticized the 
opinion, explaining that it would be hard to believe that a sick patient that gets into her doctor’s 
office right away is not receiving better care than a person who may have to wait three weeks 
for treatment. Id. 
 I believe this criticism holds true. Consider the following statement from a patient 
struggling from a serious, but undiagnosed illness. She and her husband pay $7,500 to be part 
of a boutique practice: “I had a lovely doctor who was part of a standard practice. Access to her 
was nearly impossible, response times were slow. Concerns I had with my health were 
magnified because of the difficulty I had with the system.” Gleckman, supra note 1. She also 
notes that her new doctor is giving her more attention and finding great specialists for her. Id. 
One boutique doctor reminisced about receiving information from the wife of a man who was 
suffering from terminal cancer. After making a house call to treat the man, he was told by 
family members that the man’s wife was “walking on air” because she was so happy about the 
visit. Id. Faster patient attention, coordination of specialists, and house calls, especially for a 
person with a severe illness, are certainly associated with better patient care. 
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involved.123 However, one member of the council explained in a 
report that the standard of medical care should not depend on an 
individual’s ability to pay.124 
After looking at the AMA’s Principles of Medical Ethics,125 one 
may suggest that its opinion on the ethical implications of boutique 
practices is a curious one. Principle number VII states: “A physician 
shall recognize a responsibility to participate in activities contributing 
to the improvement of the community and the betterment of public 
health.”126 Principle number IX states: “A physician shall support 
access to medical care for all people.”127  
Boutique medical practices are inconsistent with both of these 
principles. First, a boutique retainer agreement often states that a 
doctor will limit his care to a small, specific number of patients.128 A 
doctor that participates in free care for members of the community 
may go over that limit.129 This could result in a boutique patient 
bringing a breach-of-contract claim. Second, boutique practices, 
 123. applesforhealth.com, supra note 120. The council on ethical and judicial affairs 
acknowledged that boutique practices are growing in certain areas—the Pacific Northwest, the 
Northeast, the Boston area, and throughout Florida. One member of the council commented that 
if boutique practices did “take over an area, that would be a concern for us and we would have 
to revisit this issue because it is possible that (retainer practices) could threaten access. We 
couldn’t support anything that would threaten access to care.” Id. 
 Some argue that it is hard to suggest that something is ethical as long as it stays in a 
contained form. Brennan, supra note 3, at 1167. Brennan does a good job of explaining this 
argument: 
Since professional ethics is a matter of reasoning on the basis of principles, there is 
something suspect about this argument. It suggests that in the current situation—that 
is, with relatively little demand for luxury primary care—the practice can be endorsed 
by professional ethics. However, if the demands were great and access was reduced, 
then the practice would be considered unethical. This means that the definition of 
ethical practice changes with the situation . . . [s]uch situational ethics flies in the face 
of standard professional principles. 
Id. 
 124. Steve Perlstein, Boutique Medicine, AMA Briefs, 33 INTERNATIONAL MEDICAL NEWS 
GROUP FAMILY PRACTICE NEWS 13, 5 (July, 2003).  
 125. The AMA’s Principles of Medical Ethics can be found on the AMA website, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2512.html.  
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 129. See supra Part II.A. 
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which base membership on ability to pay, clearly do not support 
access to care for all people.  
B. The Legal Implications 
With medical technology and theory constantly advancing, it is 
often difficult for the legal community to keep up with trends in the 
medical community.130 Therefore, as boutique medical practices are 
relatively new, they remain beyond the reach of the law.131 For 
example, there are currently no state or federal statutes banning or 
restricting boutique medical practices. Furthermore, there is no 
published case law. Still, boutique practices raise several legal issues. 
This section explores the possible legal implications of boutique 
medicine to predict whether the law will ultimately permit or prohibit 
the relationships. 
1. Violation of Medicare Regulations—The Medicare Equal 
Access to Care Acts of 2002132 and 2003133 
In a letter to Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy 
Thompson, five legislative sponsors of the Medicare Equal Access to 
Care Act of 2002134 claim that boutique medical practices violate 
Medicare law135 in two ways.136 First, they suggest that boutique 
 130. Goldstein, supra note 62. 
 131. Id. 
 132. H.R. 4752, 107th Cong. (2002). Sponsors of the bill included four members of the 
House of Representatives (Henry A. Waxman, Sherrod Brown, Pete Stark, and Benjamin 
Cardin) and one member of the Senate (Richard Durbin) Id. The bill proposed 
[t]o amend title XVIII of the Social Security Act to prohibit physicians and other 
health care practitioners from charging a membership or other incidental fee (or 
requiring purchase of other items or services) as a prerequisite for the provision of an 
item or service to a Medicare beneficiary. 
Id. pmbl. 
 133. H.R. 2423, 108th Cong. (2003). Sponsors of this identical bill again included 
Congressmen Waxman, Brown, Stark, and Cardin. Senator Durbin was no longer a sponsor, but 
was replaced by Congressman Kleczka. 
 134. H.R. 4752, 107th Cong (2002). 
 135. Robert Hayes, president of the Medicare Rights Center agrees. He notes that “‘[t]his 
practice of “pay-for-privilege” health care undermines the ability of people to get affordable 
health care from doctors they know and trust . . . . It is in essence a physician end run around 
federal and state limits on their charges.’” Markian Hawryluk, Boutique Medicine May Run 
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practices charge more than allowed under Medicare limits.137 Under 
the Social Security Act, physicians receive Medicare reimbursement 
only if they agree to abide by the program’s rates or by limiting 
charges to 115 percent of the Medicare rate.138 Second, they suggest 
boutique practices “routinely submit erroneous bills to the federal 
government.”139 
First, the legislators observe that according to the MDVIP 
agreement, the practice still bills the patient’s insurance for most 
services.140 Therefore, a Medicare patient’s visit would be covered by 
the government and the physicians would simultaneously acquire a 
$1500 fee.141 This could violate congressional limits on charges for 
covered services.142 The legislators also alleged that physicians who 
accept membership fees for boutique services are not reporting the 
full amount of their charges.143 This would violate the False Claims 
Act.144 However, doctors maintain that the retainer only covers 
“personalized services.”145 
Afoul of Medicare Rules, amednews.com, http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2002/04/08/ 
gvsb0408.htm (Apr. 8, 2002). 
 136. Letter, supra note 55, at 2. 
 137. Id. at 1. 
 138. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(g)(2)(C) (2000). 
 139. Letter, supra note 55, at 2.  
 140. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 63. 
 141. Letter, supra note 55, at 2. 
 142. Id. The argument is that services offered for the additional membership fees overlap 
with services covered by Medicare. For example, the MDVIP brochure lists “coordination of 
necessary referrals” and “travel medical services” as covered amenities. Id. The sponsors of the 
bill explain that these services overlap with Medicare coverage because Medicare pays 
physicians for care that meets specifications in the diagnostic and management codes written by 
the AMA. Letter, supra note 55, at 3. 
 143. Id. at 3; see also Portman, supra note 52, at 4.  
 144. For example, the legislators noted that if an MDVIP patient who pays a $1,500 
membership fee sees his doctor five times in one year and Medicare is billed $100 per visit, he 
would be paying $400 per visit. See Letter, supra note 55, at 3. 
 145. MDVIP claims that the retainer fee only covers the preventative benefits and annual 
screenings that Medicaid does not cover. Hawryluk, supra note 135. In fact, part of the MDVIP 
membership agreement seems to try to eliminate any suspicions. It states: 
The membership fees specified above cover only the defined MDVIP Amenities and 
the annual comprehensive physical examination and personalized care preventive care 
plan (“Physical Exam”). Except for your Physical Exam, you and/or your insurer, as 
the case may be, will be financially responsible for paying for all healthcare and 
medical care services received by you from your Affiliated Physician and his or her 
staff. Your Affiliated Physician will bill you and/or your insurer, as the case may be, 
for those medical or health care services provided to you. 
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While the legislators’ arguments seem well-reasoned, the 
Medicare Equal Access to Care Act of 2002 never became law 
because the bill died in committee. Its 2003 successor, the Medicare 
Equal Access to Care Act of 2003, suffered the same fate. However, 
if a substantially similar bill ever passes Congress, physicians in 
boutique medical practices will be forced to opt out of the federal 
Medicare program.146 
2. Violations of Private Insurance Company Provider Agreements 
Most private insurance company provider agreements forbid 
physicians from using a “balance billing” technique.147 Balance 
billing occurs when a doctor charges an insurance beneficiary more 
than the covered amount.148 This provision could be read as banning 
boutique practices from charging retainer fees, as these fees are paid 
in exchange for the right to receive both covered and non-covered, 
personalized services.149 If the retainer arrangements are found to 
violate the Medicare regulations, they may similarly be considered a 
violation of private health insurance provider contracts.150 
Conversely, if the fees are found to comply with Medicare law 
because they only cover costs of personalized care, then it is unlikely 
they will be found in violation of private insurance provider 
contracts.151 
Membership Agreement, supra note 55, para. 5, at 2. 
 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid services (CMS), alerted to the issue of boutique 
medical practices, is currently monitoring boutique practices to ensure that physicians are not 
violating Medicare billing laws. William Hoffman, supra note 57. MDVIP is currently “under 
review.” Id. 
 146. See H.R. 2423, 108th Cong. (2003). In a letter dated May 1, 2002, Tommy Thompson 
replied to the legislators that as long as the boutique retainer fees were being used to pay for 
non-covered services, boutique practices would not violate any Medicare rules. Portman, supra 
note 52, at 5. 
 147. Portman, supra note 52, at 4. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. Insurance companies are torn in deciding whether boutique medical practices 
represent a legal risk. Premera Blue Cross in Washington and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Rochester have decided that boutique practices and the retainer fees they require violate balance 
billing and discrimination prohibitions present in their insurance contracts. Id. Regency Blue 
Shield in Washington has gone the other way, determining that retainer fees are legal as long as 
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3. Violations of Anti-Kickback Statute 
If boutique medical practices provide their patients with bonuses 
such as “heated towel racks, free hotel rooms, [and] special 
bathrobes,”152 these amenities could violate the federal anti-kickback 
statute153 or the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act154 prohibiting such inducements.155 However, since these 
amenities are offered after payment of a retainer, it is likely that they 
will be seen as services provided in exchange for payment and not as 
an “inducement.”156 
4. Violation of State Insurance Laws 
Boutique practices that offer guaranteed services for a fixed 
retainer fee could be found to violate state insurance law.157 This 
legal risk is especially directed at boutique practices like MD2 that 
provide unlimited doctor visits in exchange for a retainer fee while 
refusing to accept private insurance.158 If there is no risk bearing 
entity in case of financial failure, the patient is unprotected.159 While 
some states are skeptical that a boutique medical practice is legal 
under their insurance laws, other states’ departments of insurance 
have found no violation.160 
they are only used to cover personalized services and amenities. Id.; see also supra note 64 
(discussing the reasons why insurance companies may be worried about the implementation of 
boutique medical practices). 
 152. Goldstein, supra note 62. 
 153. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1320a-7b(b) (2004). 
 154. Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996). 
 155. Goldstein, supra note 62. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Portman, supra note 52, at 4. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id at 4–5. Physician networks and IPAs have not been found to be in violation of state 
insurance laws because there is an HMO or a health insurer that bears the risk. Id.  
 160. Id. at 5. For example, The Washington Insurance Commissioner has issued an 
advisory in which it has determined that any doctor entering into a practice that provides a 
package of health care services for a prearranged annual fee must register with the states as a 
health maintenance organization, or as a health care service contractor. Id. However, the 
Massachusetts Board of Registration in Medicine, a group that licenses Massachusetts 
physicians has reported that it has found “nothing illegal” about boutique medical practices. Id. 
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5. Abandonment of Existing Patients 
Physicians that decide to switch over to a smaller boutique 
practice will have to terminate their relationships with existing 
patients.161 If this is done incorrectly, the physician may risk an 
abandonment claim.162 
Although a physician is under no obligation to form a physician-
patient relationship,163 once a relationship is formed, it should 
continue as long as the patient’s given condition persists and requires 
attention.164 A physician may terminate a given relationship if he 
gives the patient sufficient notice to allow the patient to obtain 
another doctor.165 
As most doctors converting to a boutique practice will likely seek 
legal advice, an abandonment claim is not likely.166 As long as the 
doctor sends letters to each patient in advance, explaining that he will 
need to find a new doctor, the boutique doctor should not be liable. 
He may be the subject of some ill will,167 but there should be no legal 
impediment.168 
 161. Brennan, supra note 3, at 1167. 
 162. Id. 
 163. See Hurley v. Eddingfield, 59 N.E. 1058, 1058 (Ind. 1901). 
 164. HALL ET AL., supra note 13, at 161. 
 165. Id. at 161. This was the holding in Payton v. Weaver. 182 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1982). The plaintiff in Payton was a woman suffering from chronic end-stage renal 
disease. Id. at 226. After three years of receiving treatment from the defendant doctor, the 
doctor informed her that he would be terminating their relationship due to her persistent 
disruptive behavior and failure to follow treatment. Id at 227. He continued to provide care for 
over three months before completely terminating treatment. Id. The court found that the doctor 
gave sufficient notice and discharged him of his obligations to the plaintiff. Id. at 229. 
 166. “[I]n practice, reducing one’s patient load is no different than leaving town or moving 
to a smaller practice. As long as the physician provides notice and appropriate referrals and 
does not leave any patients in an unstable condition, the risk of a viable abandonment claim is 
very small.” Portman, supra note 52, at 5.  
 167. Dr. Karton, of Seattle Medical Associates acknowledged that when announcing his 
intention to convert his practice to a boutique practice, he heard from some patients who were 
“outraged that anything additional would be charged beyond what their insurance paid.” 
William Hoffman, supra note 57; see also supra note 71. 
 168. While a legal claim for abandonment is unlikely, converting to a boutique practice and 
thereby leaving those patients who cannot afford the new retainer fee does raise a host of ethical 
concerns. Portman, supra note 52, at 5; see also supra Part III.A. 
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C. The Possible Solution 
The question that many will have to decide when examining the 
emergence of boutique medical practices is whether this new type of 
medical practice is unethical because it is creating a new form of 
class based medicine, or whether it is an acceptable way for a few 
physicians who struggle with the complexities of managed care to 
preserve the doctor-patient relationship they once held dear. And a 
“yes” to the latter question raises another question: Can a true and 
ethical doctor-patient relationship exist if medicine is to be treated as 
a commodity on the open market, available only to those who can 
afford to pay for it? Or is boutique medicine, while a logical solution 
for some, so inherently unethical that physicians should abandon the 
idea (and perhaps their sanity) so as to preserve the sanctity of the 
doctor-patient relationship?  
In my opinion, as currently structured, boutique medicine is an 
unethical and treacherous idea for the United States’ already failing 
health care system. It is an easy way out for some doctors and the 
patients who can afford to buy their way out of a disabled health care 
system. If doctors and patients are discontent with a health care 
system that puts time limits on visits and turns doctors into the 
insurers of their own salary, then the industry needs to prepare itself 
to come forward with new ideas and programs that will assure a more 
equitable health care system allowing doctors to interact with patients 
on a caring level. The industry should not settle for a solution that 
only creates an intimate doctor-patient relationship for the wealthy 
while removing care for the poor from the agenda. 
If boutique practices continue to boom in the medical community, 
I suggest that the ideal would be for doctors to follow the lead of the 
Tufts–New England Medical Center.169 Tufts Medical Center, in an 
effort to continue quality care for the poor while keeping its 
institution financially afloat, began a boutique medical practice that 
charges willing, wealthy patients $1800 a year for VIP services. 
However, the hospital does not use the yearly retainer fees to pad its 
doctors’ pockets; the fees are used to supplement the costs of Tuft’s 
 169. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
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regular primary care practice. The hospital claims that opening the 
boutique practice has allowed it to “care for all types of patients—
wealthy and poor—in an increasingly unforgiving financial 
environment.”170 By using a boutique practice to fund a regular 
medical practice, both doctors and patients are cared for. Wealthy 
patients receive the care they are willing to pay for and ordinary 
patients receive at least the level of care they have already been 
receiving—if not better care—thanks to the boutique retainer fees. 
Doctors who wish to throw back to the good old times of the forty-
minute patient visit and the house call can do so as well. 
However, if the current type of boutique practice continues to 
become a part of the health care world in the United States, I suggest 
that some limits should be put in place. First, I think that boutique 
practices should limit their practices to boutique patients.171 If a 
practice serving VIP patients continues to treat “regular” patients, I 
believe the “regular” patients could suffer at the hands of the patients 
who are paying the doctors bills. Second, to ensure that the 
government is not being defrauded in any way, I suggest that all 
boutique practices should be banned from accepting Medicare 
monies.172 Third, I believe that any boutique practice refusing to 
accept any form of private insurance should be required to register 
with the state as an insurance company or should guarantee some 
form of insurance protection to their patients in case of financial 
failure.173 Last, I believe that each state should place a limit on the 
number of boutique practices that are allowed to register with the 
state to guarantee no serious threat to access occurs. 
 170. Smith, supra note 65, at 2. 
 171. This is in comparison to boutique practices, like Miami Medical Consultant PA in 
Coral Gables, Florida, which still treats non-boutique patients. See supra note 60 and 
accompanying text.  
 172. See supra note 135 and text accompanying notes 135–36. 
 173. See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
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CONCLUSION174  
Managed care has created a world where many doctors no longer 
enjoy their work. They work longer hours and face more 
administrative burdens, yet their relationships with patients are 
deteriorating. A stake has been driven into the heart of the doctor-
patient relationship. In order to revitalize the relationship, doctors 
have begun to create boutique medical practices—restoring medicine 
to the good old days of house calls and personal attention.  
However ideal boutique medicine may seem in theory for some, it 
is threatening to destroy the already torn fabric of the American 
health care industry for all. While boutique medicine may face legal 
problems by violating Medicare regulations, private insurance 
company agreements, and state insurance laws, it is the ethical 
implications of boutique medicine that are especially troublesome. 
Ethically, boutique medicine threatens to undermine the social 
responsibility aspects of health insurance, widen the gap between 
health care for the rich and the poor, and trample on the professional 
responsibility of doctors. Even if boutique medicine is held to a small 
number of practices due to the demands of the market, it is one more 
step in the wrong direction for the United States health care system. 
The only way for boutique practices to function ethically in today’s 
society would be if doctors used the retainer fees received from 
boutique medical clients to supplement the health care costs of the 
poor. If doctors are truly concerned with restoring the doctor-patient 
relationship, and not with increasing their incomes, then using the 
extra money to bail out the failing United States health care system 
should not be a problem. 
 174. As a side note, several medical groups that are not considered boutique practices have 
begun to charge patients for “extras” on an à la carte fee structure. Portman, supra note 52, at 
6. While these physician groups do not charge a retainer fee for year round extra amenities and 
personalized services, they charge patients on an à la carte basis for administrative services that 
are not covered under the basic patient-provider relationship. Id. Administrative services 
include things such as telephone advice, email advice, transferring and copying records, and 
providing help with completing insurance forms. Id. Some practices charge separate fees for 
each service and some charge a single annual administrative fee. Id. The annual fee is often 
small (less than fifty dollars). Id.; see also Sandra G. Boodman, That’s Going to Cost You, 
WASH. POST, May 27, 2003, at F1. 
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